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ABSTRACT 
This article reports generally on the current situation of women as it relates to Japan's fiscal 
di拓culties. It also outlines the immigration and labour situation and is intended as a succinct 
follow-up of the progress and setbacks of crucial issues raised nine years ago (McNabb, 
2006), including Japan's large dome而c deficit, shrinking tax base, and declining birthrate, in 
the context of an ever-burgeoning percentage of retired seniors and concomitant social costs. I 
have previously suggested that the Canadian multiculturalism model might offer partial 
solutions to the structural dilemmas facing the Japanese government. This is reexamined. 
Key words: immigration, women, population decline, job market, deficit 
Most of the issues in this paper have now become 
extremely popular media topics because they are 
adversely affecting Japan's fiscal prosper仰 or are at 
risk of doing so. In spite of this, there have been 
relatively few comparisons to the situation in years 
past. Nearly a decade later, then, this paper is an 
examination of the extent to which some of the 
interrelated challenges enumerated abovc havc becn 
remedi蹴ed. 
Before 2006, the serious demographic challenges that 
Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and business leaders 
would have to 血cc had already been weル 
documented, so one would expect that various 
corrective action plans would have been considered 
and set in motion. Still today, however, what to do to 
resolve the same issues continues to be discussed in a 
wide spectrum of general and scholarly publications. 
Japan seems to be just getting started. Two examples 
among many are discussed in some detail hereafter. 
Making efforts to boost the influence that women can 
exert on the economy has been largely ignored. 
Second, in the electronic"urnalげ contemporary 
japanese studies [sic], Chapple (2010) was one 
among several who had already examined the 
immigration situation in the early 2000s, and has 
once again detailed some of the likely outcomes if 
not enough is done in a timely manner to address the 
issue of population decline, which has been a concern 
伽r decades. With a continuing, very strong national 
disinclination toward mass immigration, it is still 
effectively an off-limits topic. Immigration in the 
context of Japan's consistently declining population 
w川 be examined in its own section. 
Women in the workforce 
Given the sustained, perceived unfeasibiliサ and 
definite unpaは油il iサ of having a regular intak of 
immigrants, one might reasonably expect that some 
other compensatory policies would have been 
formulated and begun in order to deal with labor 
shortages. げ immigration is truly a nonstarter, then 
INTRODUCTION 
From my paper in 2006, I variously wrote: 
It is well known, even legendary, that 
(while) at the brink of disaster at distinct 
periods in her history, Japan has managed 
to make miraculous recoveries. (McNabb, 
P91) 
Therefore, just as occurred in the Meiji 
Era over a century ago, Japanese 
policymakers would be wise to carefu抑 
examine 一 and with a similar sense of 
urgency - proven, successful policies in 
effect around the world in order to 
mitigate as much as possible against [sic] 
the dangers that lie ahead. Then, as 
before, borrowing and adaptation should 
take place as necessary (p.9l) 
It is indisputable that the serious 
challenges brought about by a rapidly 
aging socieW,a stalled birthrate, an 
imminent, large number of retirees, 
predictable declining population figures, 
indigence 州EETs and "freeters"), 
dubious academic standards at middle to 
lower-ranked universities, a massive debt, 
a tight labour market, a bloated 
bureaucracy and cutthroat competition 
must be dealt with thou帥tfully but 
quick以 拓r time is of the essence. If 
Japanese want 切 maintain their current 
lifestyle, drastic changes will be required 
(p.96). 





0画mising the role of women could become a key 
consideration. 
Increasing the amount of female participation in the 
workforce seemed to be one positive, natural and 
logical "workaround" to avoid 姐 of 止e vexations 
and nettlesome accommodations associated with 
large-scale immigration, but that potential solution 
was met with opposition at the highest levels of 
society. Already quite a few years ago, Jolivet〔 1997) 
indicated that in spite of his adequate understanding 
as to what kinds of changes would be needed in o司er 
to shore up the ailing pension system, such as 
implementing policies designed to promote greater 
participation by women in the workforce, Prime 
Minister Hashimoto criticized what he believed were 
the harmful effects of higher education on worn enIs 
primary role as caregivers, commenting that women 
should not have gone to university and 止en entered 
the workforce. This commentary seems to lend 
credence to 山e belief that the blinkered, outdated 
personal ideology of the old guard has been trumping 
the formulation of policies 旬「山e betterment of the 
nation. 
Getting ready to return women to work 
In 2006, one of former Prime Minister Koizum iIs 
more noteworthy gaffes was to have suggested that in 
the Year of the Dog women could similarケ give birth 
to more children. However he did comment about the 
importance of creating an environment where people 
would be delighted by the idea of raising children. In 
his policy speech on September 27, 2001,he 
rea拓rined his stance of"No fear, no hesitation, and 
no constraint" (MOFA, 2001) and regarding 
eliminating employment insecurity, he pledged to 
"swiftly implement regulatory reform in such areas as 
medical services, welfare and child care, and labor." 
"...In implementing these measures I will set specific 
targets, such as the creation of 10,000 new jobs 
during the course of FY 2002, through such strategies 
as the zero-waiting list for nursery schools" (MOFA, 
加01). Clearly there was hesitation, because this 
turned out to be an unfulfilled promise. In fact, it 
appears that except in Yokohama (see below), the 
data show that, to date, not enough has been done to 
nurture a deli帥tful environment in m可or centres 
where the population concentration is greatest. 
Compared to women in many other countries, 
Japanese women have had a much lower work均ree 
participation rate and have given birth to fewer 
children. According to data from The World Bank, 
from 2引0-2引3 the percentage of Japanese women 
who were in the labour force (49%) substantialケ 
lagged behind many other developed countries 
including Canada (62%), Germany (54%), the UK 
(56%), Singapore (58%), Switzerland (61%), the 
USA (56%+), the Netherlands (59%), Scandinavia 
(59%), Australia (59%) and New Zealand 価2%). 
Other surveys (Matsui, 2014) show that after 
childbirth, Japanese women did want to return to the 
wo止force but were no longer able to find suitable 
positions. So it was not a case of them choosing to 
remain out of the workforce (For readers familiar 
with similar OECD data, that data is calculated 
differently and shows higher rates of participation in 
all countries, but still corroborates the consistent lag 
in Japan.). From 2010-2012, along with Singapore, 
Hong Kong and South Korea, Japan's birthrate was 
among 山e world's lowest at 1.4 a叫 h司 remained 
almost unchanged since 1995 (1.26-1.4り．Fewer 
Japanese women continued to work and at the same 
time couples elected not to have children. The most 
recent OECD report, "Economic Survey of Japan" 
(2015) lists a number of contributing factors 
including an utterly inadequate national childcare 
budget, outdated taxation rules that discourage 
women from fully working, and corporate culture 
that prevents an appropriate work-life balance. To be 
direct, physically and emotionally tired people have 
weak libidos. 
Recently in 2015, in a complete volte-face from his 
previous stance, Prime Minister Abe declared that he 
would take measures to ensure that 30% of women 
would be in leadership or management positions 
within five years, by 2020. This policy statement is at 
山e Cabinet Office's gender website, "Among the 
goals of his 'womenotnicsI initiative is to raise the 
proportion of mothers who will return to work after 
山e birth of their first child to 55 percent by the year 
2020" (Fifield, 2014). He has also committed to 
increasing the number of daycare facilities. This is an 
excellent, very welcome target when set against the 
backdrop of societal attitudes toward women in the 
workplace, for, according to data from the World 
Economic Forum, Japan ranked 104th in gender 
equality Out of 142 countries and territories, up one 
spot from 2013. It is an important and necessary 
socioeconomic 	 initiative, 	 however, 	 since 
approximately 3,000,000 women in Japan have 
wanted to return 加 work but could not due to 
insufficient daycare facilities (Matsui, 2010) 
There is every reason for optimism on this front 
because Yokohama has already eliminated the 
problem of not having enou帥 daycare facilities by 
offering public land and increasing its budget for 
subsidies as well as 可 deregulating the market to 
訓ow private companies to participate. It is important 
to note that the driving force behind these rapid 
changes was Yokohama's no-nonsense声male mayor, 
Fumiko Hayashi, a 柘rnier high pro相e business 
executive. In just t、、o years 144 new daycares were 
built and the wait list of overし500 children in 2引0 
is now zero. It is possible that Mr. AbeIs target of 
400,000 new openings (200,000 by 2015 and another 
200,000 可 2017) and three-year extended child-care 
leave will be reached. 
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Women in businessー~ the numbers 
For sonic time, Kathy Matsui of Goldman Sachs has 
been a well known, astute proponent of increasing 
the number of women in business, especia取， and has 
been credited with having coined the term 
"Womenomics," recently co-opted by Prime Minister 
Abe. Her awareness of the increasingly disturbing 
demographic outlook combined with awareness of 
the deepサrooted male tendency to undervalue 
women in business promプed her to write 
"Womenomics: Buy the Female Economy" (1999) in 
which she advocated utilising the power of women in 
Japan for the good of the economy. This was in stark 
contrast to the views of then Prime Minister 
Hashimoto and other leaders of the time. 
Unfortunately, there was Ii川e change, so in 2004 she 
followed up her initial report with a statistics laden 
report, "Womenomics: Japan's Hidden Asset" that 
clearly quantified the monetary benefits of having 
more women in the workforce such as a greater than 
10% increase in GDP. Once again, in 2引Os叱 
sounded the alarm 句 writing "Womenomics 3.0: The 
time is now." As conveyed in the report's title, she 
did not mince words. She wrote, 
It is more critical now than ever be島re 山「 
Japan to leverage half its population more 
fully (p.3). 
Japan's demographic tsunami is upon us (p.3). 
While the overall female employment has risen 
to a record level of 60%, there is 就ill a long 
way to go. 70% of Japanese women still 
leave the workforce after their first chil4 
and only 65% of college-educated women 
are employed (p.3). 
Obstacles to higher female employment include 
insufficient childcare and nursing care 
support, tax distortions, inadequate focus of 
the private and public sectors on diversity, 
and rigid immigration laws (p.3). 
While Womenomics is only part of the solution 
to Japan's demographic and growth 
challenges, we believe that given 山C 
limited alternatives, Japan has no choice but 
to tap its most underutilized resource. It's 
hard to run a marathon with just one leg 
(p.3). 
Previously and more recently, she has discussed 山e 
necess抑 of capitalizing on J叩an's most valuable and 
hitherto underutilized labour resource (Matsui 2010, 
2014). In Womenomics 4.0: Time to Walk the Talk, 
Matsui (2014) suggests that policymakers do seem to 
understand the gravity of Japan's myriad problems. 
However, as a result of a shrinking and 
greying workforce, acute labor 
shortages, and a recovering economy, a 
growing number of policymakers and 
citizens are finally becoming convinced 
that gender diversity in the wo止place is 
no longer an opt ion; rather, it is an 
imperative. Japan can no longer afford 
not to leverage half its population 
(Matsui et al., 2014, p.3). 
Japan's severe demographic headwinds 
mean that unless radical steps are 水en 
quickly, the nation faces the risk not 
only of longer-term economic 
stagnation, but of economic contraction 
and lower standards of IMng as we比 
(p.5) 
It is weルdocumented that the number of workers has 
been declining and recently more rapidly as baby 
boomers retire. Labour shortages are becoming more 
pronounced particularly in the construction industry. 
This has already lead to increased infrastructure costs 
and p回ect delays as employers have no choice but to 
pay higher labour costs in order to attract workers or 
slop p画ects because of insufficient labour. 
Worldwide, women choose not to do construction 
work, so in this case immigration intake is the only 
solution. In the service industry as welし the hou町 
rate has been creeping up so that employers can get 
enough workers. 
SI i帥t improvements for women in business 
While the situation is unmistakably dire given that 
the country's national debt now greatly exceeds 200% 
of GDP (by far the worst among developed 
countries), there has been gradual improvement in 
female representation in employment. For example, 
from 2000 to 20)3 the number of 25-29 year-old 
women still in the workforce has risen more than 5% 
and daycare capaciW has increased, although it is 
expensive in To町o. According to Goldman Sachs' 
2010 and 2014 studies, there is still room to increase 
the number of women in the workplace and boost the 
GDP 可 10% or even more. The optimum GOP 
increase of 13% assumes an equal percentage of men 
and women working (about 80%). 
In 2川3, the government requested that listed 
companies disclose gender-related statistics. Only 
17% did. Even still, it is a welcome step in the right 
direction. However, it is not surprising that steps 切 
advance women's roles in business and government is 
slow, since there is an utter pauc町 of elected female 
representatives and very few female leaders within 
山a civil service. In ぬCt, Japan has almost the lowest 
per person representation m the worid - 50% less 
than in Korea, 3 times less than China and 5.5 times 
less than Sweden (Matsui, 2014, p. 13). In business, 
currently the situation is similarly bleak. Only about 
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10.5% of section chie氏 are women. which is a 
minute 0.5% increase since 2005. The percentage of 
female representation in Japan at the managerial level 
has seen sli帥t, incremental gains since 2005, but is 
still far below other developed countries such as the 
UK, Germany, the USA and Canada. At the 
boardroom level, in 2013 only 12.1% of listed 
companies had one or more female board members, 
ranking Japan at dead last among 23 developed 
countries and second last in the world according to 
the GM! Ratings' 2013 Women on Boards Survey (p. 
3, 20, 22). Still, it was a 2.2% increase over previous 
years. Given my significant firsthand knowledge of 
this situation through personal connections, even 
within proactive firms, 3-4 female internal and 
external directors Out of 20 or more directors overall 
is now considered rather nrogressive. The above data 
ammy reliaoie anecuoiai Knowleag, uemonstrate 
that there is ample opportunity for Japan to become a 
more dynamic and vigorous society by taking 
concrete 吐eps that will empower more women. 
In order to attract and keep more women in the 
workforce at all levels and in all sectors, first there 
has to be a paradigm shift. Matsui notes that in a 
20ロ Cabinet Office survey, 52% of 止e Japanese 
respondents (including women themselves)stated 
that women should stay at home and men should 
work, marking a 10% increase 丘om the previous 
survey conducted in 2009 (p. 25). Thus, to change the 
mindset of society will take time, but whatever 
changes occur will have to be part of a made in Japan 
solution, since it would be simplistic to imagine that 
such a shift needs to be or ever could be acopy of the 
policies implemented in successんl countries such as 
in Scandinavia, the Netherlands, Canada or Germany 
because Japan is different and always has been. It is a 
typical Japanese trait to proudly declare that they are 
different. Nevertheless, taking the unfavourable 
future population trends into account (e各,り2050 
38% of the population may be over 65), Japanese 
leaders would be wise to examine what other 
countries have done and act quickly and decisively, 
釦r time is of the essence. While still falling short of 
the current situation in other countries, Prime 
Mmnister Abe's declaration that from fiscal year 20巧 
(precisely now) at least 30% of new civil servants 
will be women, is a bold, much-needed, non partisan 
first move forward demonstrating real leadership. It 
remains 加 be seen whether Abe's other "Mieru-ん’' 
(gender initiatives website) initiatives will also hear 
fruit, but there is reason for guarded, mild o誹imism 
given the effectiveness of top-down decision making 
that is a mainstay of Japanese society. Because of the 
government's continuing stance on immigration, to a 
very large extent, the successful implementation of 
proposed policies designed to improve women's roles 
in society seems set to determine 山e economic fate 
of the country. 
In my previous paper I cautioned against falling into 
the trap of intellectual flaccidiサ by too easily 
accepting straight-line demographic and economic 
pr可ections reaching Out to 2050, since the world is 
very complex and situations can and do change 
quickly (McNabb, 2006). This caveat duly noted, 
nearly a dec司e later, various improvements for 
women are only now just getting underway. The slow 
pace notwithstanding, there has even been a recent, 
favourable shift in attitude among young men]8-34 
years-old toward their future spouse as a working 
mother (Matsui, 2014, p. 30). 
Even if women take on a much more active role in 
Japanese business, mitigate to some extent Japan's 
labour shortage and even suddenly decide 加 have 
many more children (which is extremely unlikely), 
there句 producing a ha可 boom, all of these 
combined will not be enough to fill future labour 
shortages according to prevailing expert opinion. 
Calculations are becoming easier and are more 
accur誠e than a decade ago. Babies born in 2川Sー 
2020 won't enter the workforce until 2035-2040, 
which would be too late since they would only just be 
beginning to make much needed pension 
contributions. This leads us to immigration as another 
possible solution. 
Immigration 
Many people in various countries around the world 
view immigration - and therefore immigrants - quite 
matter-of-factly, as an accepted, important, yet 
essentia取 unremarkable aspect of their socie年 
When there is trouble (e.g., recently in the USA 
France or Australiの,governments have been trying 
in earne吐 to make bona fide improvemen加，realising 
that immigrants are a net benefit to society. The same 
cannot be said 拓r Japan. 
After having had many opportunities to make 
changes over two decades (being well aware of the 
problems associated with declining population), the 
immigration situation in Japan has actua取 mildly 
worsened. The majority of Japanese steadfastly reject 
this view, however. 
For readers facing time constraints, regrettably, it is 
possible to generally yet accurately characterize 止e 
current government's posture on immigration in the 
拓Ilowing few words. Al山ough I have been unable加 
determine the name and exact broadcast date of the 
TV programme on which Prime Minister Abe 
appeared, there is no reason to doubt the credibility 
of long-term, Japan-based commentator Jonathan 
Soble of the Financial Times and TheNew York 
Times who, on June 2, 2014 wrote that 
"The Prime minister's [sic] answer 
could hardly have been clearer~or 
more disheartening 拓r advocates of a 
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radical new embrace of outsiders. 
'In countries that have accepted 
immigration, there has been a 凧 of 
什iction, a lot of unhappiness both for 
the newcomers and the people who 
have already lived 山crc,' he told 由C 
audience, as he held up a white 
signboard marked with a red "x" to 
underscore his negative position on 
the issue" (Soble, 2014). 
This is the same prime minister who, in halting 
English, has been using JETRO to publicly invite 
foreigti investment stating that Japan and Japanese 
society are undergoing wholesale changes the likes of 
which haven't been seen in fifty years 一 except in 
immigration. Regarding immigration, Abe faithfully 
a市Cuはes the sentiments of most Japanese people, as 
is demonstrated in the excerpts below. 
''The Asahi Shimbun newspaper poli in June 2引0 
asked Japanese about accepting immigrants to 
'maintain economic vitali与’Twenかsix percent 
favored 也e idea. Sixty-five percent opposed it" 
(Harlan, 2010). 
"A pollりthe Jりi news agency in March (2014) 
showed thatjust under 60 percent would be willing to 
accept an increase in temporary [my emphasis] 
foreign workers to address labour shortages..."(Soble, 
2014). 
Yasutoshi Nishimura at the Cabinet Office, who is a 
deputy minister in the Cabinet Office in charge of the 
government's policies on foreign labour, says he is 
swamped 句 anti-immigration phone calls and 
Facebook messages whenever the issue comes up. 
"It's ordinary housewives, worried that there would 
be more crime" (Soble, 2014). 
In April 2014 a Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper poll 
indicated mat while Japanese are worried about the 
problems associated with declining population, 
regarding securing the labor supp塊 the top two 
answers were to "increase the rate of working women 
and encourage more elderly to work. Only 37 percent 
said more foreign workers should be accepted, and 
only 10 percent of those said manual workers should 
be brought in" (Matthews, 2014). 
In The New York Times, citing experts, Tabuchi 
(201l)reported that Japan was losing skilled talent 
across industries. Investment banks, for examp垣 
were moving more staff members to hubs like Hong 
Kong and Singapore, which have more foreigner-
friendly immigr而on and taxation regimes, lower 
costs of living and local populations that speak better 
English. 
"The shrinking population is the biggest problem. 
The country is fighting for its survivaじ’ said 
Hidenori Sakanaka, director of the Japan Immigration 
Policy Institute, an independent research 
organization. "Despite everything, America manages 
to stay vibrant because it attracts people 丘om all over 
the world," he said. "On the other hand, Japan is 
content to all but shut out people from overseas" 
(Tabuchi, 2011). 
The foregoing clearly indicates that for 社 least the 
most recent 拓ur years,山e general keling toward 
回ecting immigrants has remained strong and 
constant. 
In principle, then, at least insofar as the current Abe 
administration is concerned, permanent immigration 
is not being considered. In Soble (2014), Nishimura 
says 'We don't use the word 'immigration.' There is 
still a strong insular mentality. Still, [iti would be a 
big change for Japan." 
Some foreigners are leaving 
In the same way that the lll可or町 of Japanese would 
prefer not to have foreigners on their soil (jus 
saP2guinis), increasingly it would appear ihat certain 
foreigners would rather not stay. 
Foreigners who submitted new applications for 
residential status - an important indicator of hi如し 
skilled labor because the status requires a specialized 
profession 一 slumped 49 percent in 2009 from a year 
earlier to just 8,905 people. Also in 2009, the number 
of registered foreigners declined for the first time 
since recoms began to be kept. There was a 1.4 
percent drop. And in 2008, only l1,000 of the 
approximately l30,000 foreign 吐udents studying in 
Japanese universities and technical colleges were 
able to find secure employment probably due to the 
effects of the so-called "Lehman Shock." It is worth 
noting that throu帥out 2009 the yen was consistently 
very strong in USD terms, at approximately 91 yen in 
January and ending the year at just under 93, so from 
an economic perspective there was considerable 
incentive to remain in Japan. This means that Japan 
must have lost its appeal for some other reasons. 
Likely, one main reason was that economic 
conditions were worsening in some sectors causing 
industry and government to come up with some 
controversial initiatives such as p町ing to 
permanen仰 send home "Nikkei" visa holders. Jiro 
Kawasaki, a senior member of the LDP political 
party who spearhe司ed the plan is quoted in TheNew 
York Times: "We should slop letting unskilled 
laborers into Japan. We should make sure that even 
three-K jobs are paid well, and that they are 皿ed by 
Japanese. I do not think that Japan should ever 
become a multiethnic society" (Tabuchi, 2009). This 
comment combined with Nishimura's and Abe's more 
rece吐 comments do rather 吐「ongly suggest that 





The government has been taking measures to attract 
qua皿ed 旬reign talent through its 'Points-based 
Preferential immigration Treatment for Highly 
Skilled Foreign Professionals" initiative, launched in 
2012. In its first round, it 血iled quite dramatica取, 
attracting just 434 people perhaps because the bar 
had been set too hi帥，effectively filtering Out almost 
all exce世 those who were already well established in 
their careers, begging the question,W取 uproot and 
leave for Japan? The initiative was revamped in 
2014, so it is still too early to form any strong, 
definitive conclusions, but in 2014 it was not fu取 
subscribed andりthe end of March 2014 only 59 had 
entered Japan under this visa category, a noticeably 
slower rate than under the previous, more severe 
regime. Yet when I filled out the most recent 
app恥ation, I 均und that for a reasonably well-
educated 30 加 34 year-old, getting 60 points was 
actually not exceedingly difficult. Therefore, there 
may be other reasons keeping people from moving to 
Japan and not just fear about radiation. Simply put, 
the dearth of participants would indicate that there 
have to be more benefits offered in order to entice 
this class of worker to immigrate to Japan. The 
world's young elite are not going to move to Japan 
without due consideration, as there is global 
competition to attract the best and the brightest. Why 
move to Japan when another country has better 
resettlement conditions? What would prompt an 
already successful thirty-something, well-educated 
person or couple to leave their Sydney, Toronto, 
Shan帥ai lifestyles to be cramped into a 70m2 
apartment in central Tokyo for the same income or 
sli帥tly more9 Also, regarding the visa itselt 
acco司ing to current 而pulations, if entrants under 
this category change their visa to a permanent 
resident status after five or more years (not an 
uncommon visa category among long-term 
residents), they lose all previously accorded PR Status 
privileges. Unlike regular permanent residents, they 
would also be su可ect to deportation if they were to 
try to retire or lost their employment for six months 
or more. It is perplexing that the rules for getting 
permanent resident status have been relaxed while at 
the same time their status under that visa (at this 
time) would be diminished relative to other PR visa 
holders. In light of the foregoing, that the government 
hopes to attract 5,000 hi帥ly skilled foreigners 可 
2017 is a wildly oプimistic target since, from 2005, 
there has been an observable trend among educated 
foreigners from North America and Oceania, 
Germany, 山e UK, and even China, Korea to leave 
(or not come to) Japan. In some countries the trend 
began earlier, but overall the decline started in 201a 
Even well after the Great Japan East Earthquake, this 
trend continues. 
Japan could study the points-based systems used in 
Australia, Canada and the USA, which seem to work 
well, and certainly there is no shortage of applicants 
拓「 these countries. This noted, if山e government is 
rea取 only seeking temporary residents, albeit 
educated ones, careful comparisons to other systems 
that have been designed to attract and re1a加 may not 
be worthwhile. There have been few substantive 
improvements as regards immigration since my first 
paper published in 2006 that suggested immigration 
issues needed immediate attention. Moreover, it 
appears that at this time no new initiatives are being 
contemplated. 
According to Ministry of Justice records, by far, the 
bulk of college 計udents, researchers, engineers, 
professors, intra-company transferees and skilled 
laborers were from Asia, supporting to some extent, 
the trend of declining participation from North 
America, Europe and Oceania. Meanwhile, the 
population and workforce decline in some prefectures 
continues unabated, live Chubu prefectures have 
negative net migration coupled with an aging 
population. In fact, 39 prefectures registered a decline 
in population according to 2012-2013 government 
figures. Akita, Aomori, Yamagata, Kochi and 
Wakayama, were particularly hard-hit. In addition, 
mere is a general trend that the prefectures 
experiencing population decline also have the hi帥est 
percentage of people over 65 and the fewest number 
of children. It is common knowledge for many in 
Japan that there is an ongoing demographic 
hollowing out and calcification of rural Japan. In 
司dition, there is the apparent problem of uchimuki 
that is stopping young Japanese from wanting to go 
abroad. This trend has been constant since 2004. 
Notably, the number of Japanese students 計udying in 
the USA, which is their preferred academic 
destination, has dropped to the point that Japanese 
are no longer the laraest number of加「eimi students 
mere tnow i J.We snouio not oiame Sujuents, 
however, because one of the main reasons cited 句 
Japanese youth for not wanting to study abroad is 
that such experience is not considered valuable, 
most prospective Japanese employers. It would 
appear 山at it is the older members of society who 
continue to be inward looking. This increasing raw 
number of young people who are expressly avoiding 
becoming グ 12 ーパル人材 惚lobally competent), 
combined with the national distaste for immigrants, 
especially from Asia, bodes very poorly for Japan's 
future. 
The Canadian model 
The Canadian model is still available for Japanese 
bureaucrats and politicians 加 draw on. It wo止S. 
Unlike in Europe or the USA where multicultural 
policies are comparatively weaker, resulting in 
various problems, in Canada there haven't been any 
massive spikes in crime or violence. In 伽ct, on a per 
capita basis, crime of a"types has been falling year 
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on year. From 2003 to 2012, according to Can面a's 
Crime Seveniサ index, both the volume and the 
seriousness of crime in Canada dropped by 36%.2 In 
2013 the decline was the largest since 1998. So Prime 
Minister Abets simplistic premise wherein he equates 
the somewhat under planned immigration in Europe 
with guaranteed, de facto greater crime in Japan (Le一, 
immigration doesn't work), seems like deliberate 
conflation designed to distort peo目eIs perceptions. It 
does not follow at all that an increase in crime is a 
corollary that must be inextricably linked in an 
increase in immigration. Many problems can be 
prevented from the outset with planning and by 
having proper systems in place. ln Canada, crime 
consistently fell while immigration intake was 
constant at between roughly 220,000 and 250,000 
people per annum, proving over the long term that 
Abe's assumptions are not necessarily correct and are 
probably sloppy. 
Canadian multiculturalism has matured over many 
dec司es. To be sure, there have been 飼se starts. 
errors, examples of bigotry and plenty of genuine 
misunderstandings. Through it all, however, even 
when there hasn't always been full acceptance of 
immigration by all citizens, there has been real 
commitment to fair, transparent government policies. 
The governments in Canada have calculated that 
there are net monetary and social benefits that derive 
from having a diverse, somewhat younger workforce. 
Onサ trailing the USA by one percent, Canada had 
the lowest percentage of people over 65 (14.8% in 
2011) of the G-7 countries. According to StatsCan 
projections, it will not be until sometime between 
205l and 2060 山at 25% of the population is 65 or 
older. Most importantly, among G-7 countries 
Canada has the hi如est proportion of working-age 
people (68.5%), so the base supporting the 
population pyramid is relatively stable. Indeed, 
within the working-age population, the highest 
income earners and hence由e highest taxpayers were 
aged between 45-64 and accounted for 42.4% of the 
total. 
Unlike Japan, Canada is experiencing a decades-o凪 
carefully controlled population increase of between 
0.8% and 1.2%. However, some researchers, 
including me, are mindful that population increase 
mainly resulting from international migration (over 
65%) may currently be too high. There is no 
opposition to immigration per Sc, only the amount 
and placement. It is being observed now that intake 
of too many too fast is beginning to Strain the limits 
of cultural integration, particularly in and around the 
Greater Toronto Area, which receives most of the 
national intake (nearly 50% of all immigrants in 
Canada choose to live in the GTA). If Japan were to 
embrace thoughtful, systematic immigration as a 
means of dealing with demographic and revenue 
challenges, bureaucrats would be 加vised to consider 
the number of entrants, as well as their placement. 
Conclusion 
Opportunities for women in Japan have improved 
and will continue to improve. If Matsui is correct, 
Japanese women will he able m add a great deal to 
the GOP. the vitaliW and the mindset of the nation. 
At last, 山e んture 均r working Japanese women 
seems to be quite bright. 
Converseり, nearly a decade later, there is nothing 
positive to report about immigration policy trends. 
When viewed from the outside, there has been 
backsliding. For example, the most recent initiatives 
designed to attract hi帥ly qualified professionals and 
nurses from the Philippines seem half-hearted at best. 
Other countries' (Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and Sweden) successful immigration systems have 
been disregarded even against the advice of experts 
such as Hidenori Sakanaka, while at the same time 
sound bites that the dangers of European and 
American-like immigrant-crime would be Japan's 
fate as well, have been exaggerated and over-
publicized. Domestica町，the Ministry of Justice set 
up a hotline and website for Japanese to report 
拓reign crime (especially visa overstayers) and 
perceived 均reign crime even as 拓reign crime in 
Japan decreased and the foreign crime ratio was no 
higher than that of Japanese citizens一in other words, 
very low. Such measures seem to suggest 山at there 
won't be significant attitudinal changes toward 
immigration in the near term. Finally, it is worth 
mentioning that most other advanced countries do not 
even track foreign crime. 
I fear that Japan's aversion to accepting long-term 
immigrants may prove to be her downfall. With 
regard to utilising women as a valuable resource, 
Matsui has written that it is time to "walk the talk" 
(Matsui, 2014). The same concept holds true for 
immigration. Time is of the essence. If another 
decade is allowed 加 pass without squarely 
addressing the need to better accommodate well 
qualified, vibrant foreign workers, there is some 
probabiliW that Japan's standard of living could begin 
a period of decline unless there is some type of 
sudden, unpredictable economic windfall (Sony 
Walkman, a world standard ceo-battery, etc.). While 
it is wonderful that Japanese women may well have 
opportunities to rise to their full potential, 
numerically it seems impossible that their 
contributions alone will be able to make up for the 
both the looming, imminent workforce shortfall and 
accompanying lack of tax revenues. We also can 
surmise that given the current state of affairs in 
Japan, there will be no baby boom anytime soon. 
Therefore, without immigration, Current strai帥t- line 
population pr可ections at least until 2035 to 2040 will 
be accurate: the popuはion will fall and labor 
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shortages will conhinue in some sectors. 
Japan is at an important crossroads or will be at one 
very soon. While it seems that' 'Abenomics" may 
provide a boost to certain sectors of the economy, 
others are faltering. Even if the monetary easing and 
the pumlp- priming of "Abenomics" strengthen the 
economy, this stren群h will most likely not endure 
over the long-term and probably will not be enough 
to reduce the domestic debt to a manageable level. 
There is alre加y a labor shortage in some sectors. 
Immigration is a taboo topic, but barring exorbitant 
taxation or some new, unforeseen solutions, in the 
face of a predictably declining and aging population, 
it seems to be Japan's only choice. 
1.Author's spouse is one such director and former 
director of women's executive groups. Author knows 
many female directors through her. 
2. All data provided in The Canadian Model were 
taken from the Stati就ics Canada web site at 
http://wwwl  2.計atcan.gc.calcensusrencensement!inde 
x-eng.cfm 
htt p：ノノ www.statcan .gc.caipubl8s-002-x/20 1400v 
article!! 4040-eng.htm 
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